PENGARUH KEPEMILIKAN KELUARGA, KEDEKATAN DIREKSI &Amp; KOMISARIS DENGAN PEMILIK PENGENDALI TERHADAP KOMPENSASI DIREKSI &Amp; KOMISARIS PERUSAHAAN DI PASAR MODAL INDONESIA
Keywords: compensation of director and commisioner, good corporate governance, kompensasi direksi komisaris, ownership structure, struktur kepemilikan, teori keagenan
Abstract
The purpose of this study was to examine whether family ownership and Directors Commissioner who have close relations with owner has an influence on the compensation of the Board of Directors and Commissioner. This study uses data companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange 2004-2006 period, indicating that the higher proportion of families in the company and the lower involvement in the management of the company, the lower the compensation of Directors and Commissioner. This means that if a family is only acting as an owner, but does not have a high involvement in the management of the company, the compensation Board of Directors and commissioner to be more optimal. In other words the family control as the owner of the Commissioner and Directorss compensation is effective.
Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk menelaah apakah kepemilikan keluarga dan direksi komisaris yang memiliki kedekatan dengan pemilik mempunyai pengaruh terhadap kompensasi direksi komisaris. Penelitian ini menggunakan data perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia periode 2004-2006. Hasil menunjukkan bahwa semakin tinggi proporsi keluarga dalam perusahaan dan semakin rendah keterlibatannya dalam pengelolaan perusahaan, semakin rendah kompensasi direksi komisaris. Artinya apabila keluarga hanya bertindak sebagai pemilik namun tidak memiliki keterlibatan yang tinggi dalam pengelolaan perusahaan, maka kompensasi direksi komisaris menjadi lebih optimal. Atau dengan kata lain kontrol keluarga sebagai pemilik terhadap kompensasi direksi komisaris berjalan dengan efektif.
Downloads
References
Bebchuck & Jesse M. Fried. (2004). Executive compensation as an agency problem. The journal of economic perspectives, vol. 17(3), 71-92.
Chalmers, K., Ping-Sheng Koh, & Geof Stapledon. (2006). The determinant of ceo compensation: rent extraction or labour demand. The british accounting review, 1-17.
Claessens, S., Simeon Djankov, & Larry H.P. Lang. (1999). The separation of ownership and control in east asian corporations. Journal of financial economics, vol 58, 81-112.
Claessens, S., Stijn, Simeon Djankov, & Larry H. P. Lang. (1999). Who controls east asian corporations. Working paper, Washington D.C.: World Bank.
Claessens, S., Stijn, Joseph R. H. Fan, & Larry H. P. Lang. (1999). Expropriation of minority shareholders; evidence from east asia, Working paper. Washington D.C.:World Bank.
Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov, Joseph R. H. Fan, & Larry H. P. Lang. (2002). Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. Journal of finance, vol 57(6). 2741-2771.
Core, E. J., Robert W. Holthausen, David F. Larcker. (1999). Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of financial economics, vol 51, 371-406.
Elloumi, Fathi & Jean-Pierre Gueyle. (2001). ceo compensation, ios and the role of corporate governance. Corporate governance (1,2, 23-33), MBC University Press.
Gaver, J. Jennifer & Kenneth M. Gaver. (1995). Compensation policy and the investment opportunity set. Financial management, vol. 24(1). (Spring), 19-32.
Hung, Lei, Adrian Cheuk & Song, Frank M. (2005). Corporate governance, family ownership, and firm valuations in emerging markets: Evidence from hong kong panel data1. Di download dari website Http://Ssrn.Com/Abstract
Total Penghasilan Tunai di Berbagai Industri.(2005). http://www.portalhar.com.
Jensen, C. Michael (1976). A theory of the firm. governance, residual claims, and organizational forms. Cambridge, Massachussetts, London, England: Harvard University Press.
La Porta, R., Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer. (1998). Corporate ownership around the world. The journal of finance, vol. LIV, No. 2 (April).
Lukviarman, N. (2004). Ownership structure and firm performance: the case of Indonesia. Thesis of doctoral degree of business administration of Curtin University.
Mace, L. M. (1971). Directors: Myth And Reality. In thomas clarke (Ed). Theories of corporate governance; the philosophical foundations of corporate governance. London And New York: Routledge, Taylor & Fancis Group.
Prowsen, Stephen. (1998). Corporate governance, emerging issues and lessons from east Asia. Http://Www.Worldbank.Org
Sato, Yuri. (2004). Corporate goverance in Indonesia: A study on governance of business groups. In Yasutami Shimomura (Ed). The role of governance in asia, asian development experience, vol. 2. Singapore: Institute of south-east asian studies (ISEAS).
Syakhroza, A. (2004). Model komisaris untuk efektivitas GCG di Indonesia. Usahawan No. 05 TH XXXIII.
Shastri, Weston, Copeland (2005). Ginancial theory and corporate policy. International Edition. Pearson Addison Wesley.
Yeh, Yin-Hua, Tsun-Siou Lee & Tracie Woidtke. (2001). Family control and corporate governance: Evidence from Taiwan. International Review Of Finance, vol 2, 21-48.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.