

## **Governance of Social Data Verification in the PBI-JKN Program: A Study of the Ministry of Social Affairs' Policy on the Deactivation of 7.39 Million Recipients**

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Received: 09 July 2025; Revised: 08 December 2025; Accepted: 15 May 2026

### **Abstract**

This article discusses the governance of social data verification in the implementation of the National Health Insurance Contribution Assistance Recipient (PBI-JKN) policy, highlighting the case of the Ministry of Social Affairs deactivating 7.39 million participants in 2025. Using a policy study approach and good governance theory, this article analyzes how data accuracy, inter-agency coordination, and the principle of social justice are integrated (or ignored) in policy implementation. The results of the analysis show that, although this policy is based on the validity of DTSEN data, there are weaknesses in the mechanisms for community participation and for mitigating social impacts. This study recommends strengthening data system integration, local government involvement, and affirmative policy guarantees for affected vulnerable groups. These findings are relevant to improving the practice of data-based social policy governance in Indonesia.

### **Keywords:**

good governance; public policy; social data verification; PBI-JKN.

### **Introduction**

The National Health Insurance Premium Assistance Program (PBI-JKN) is part of the government's efforts to build an inclusive and socially just social security system, as mandated by Law No. 40 of 2004 on the National Social Security System. This program is designed to ensure access to health services for poor and underprivileged communities, whose premiums are paid by the state through a subsidy scheme. In practice, PBI-JKN is a crucial instrument for promoting the fulfillment of citizens' basic rights in the health sector and an indicator of the extent to which the state fulfills its protective role toward its citizens within the framework of the welfare state. (Koenti, n.d.) However, implementing this program often faces serious challenges, particularly in data collection and beneficiary validation. One of the structural challenges that continues to arise is data inconsistencies, weak inter-agency coordination, and a lack of local government involvement in verifying and updating PBI-JKN beneficiary data. (Rosyadi, 2016)

The crux of this issue is evident in the policy of the Ministry of Social Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, which in 2025 deactivated 7.39 million PBI-JKN recipients on the grounds of inconsistencies with the National Integrated Socioeconomic Data (DTSEN) and welfare classifications that no longer fall within deciles 1–5. (detiknews, n.d.) This policy has sparked both support and opposition within the public. On one hand, this step reflects efforts to improve the targeting of evidence-based social assistance using up-to-date data. On the

other hand, this decision creates new forms of social exclusion, particularly for affected communities that lack the capacity or access to navigate the reactivation procedures. This highlights a gap between data-driven policy design and the complex, dynamic realities of society. In the context of public administration, this phenomenon indicates suboptimal governance in the verification of social data, particularly with respect to transparency, accountability, and public participation. (Dwiyanto, 2021)

Data validity is the cornerstone of formulating and implementing social policies that are fair, effective, and targeted. In Indonesia, issues regarding data validity in social assistance programs such as PBI-JKN have become a chronic problem that hinders the realization of evidence-based policy making. Data errors stemming from the lack of integration of information systems, weak verification capacity at the local level, and inconsistencies in population data updates contribute significantly to the inefficiency of social policies. In the context of PBI-JKN, the failure to provide valid data not only leads to budget duplication and leakage but also can create exclusion errors that deprive citizens of their right to basic health services (Kulon, n.d.).

Thus, it is important to examine in greater depth how the governance of social data verification is carried out within the PBI-JKN policy, as well as how the dynamics among stakeholders such as the Ministry of Social Affairs, BPJS, the Directorate General of Civil Registration and Population, and local governments influence the implementation and impact of this policy. This research is crucial not only for evaluating the effectiveness of data-driven social policies but also for proposing policy improvements to make them more responsive to the principles of social justice and the values of good governance.

One of the fundamental problems with data validity is the weak integration among the Integrated Social Welfare Data (DTKS), now known as DTSEN, population data systems, and data from other sectors, such as BPJS Health and the Directorate General of Civil Registration and Population (Dukcapil). This lack of synchronization is exacerbated by the fact that data-updating processes often still rely on administrative rather than participatory, community-based approaches. In fact, a study by Ruhjana & Ferdiansyah (2020) shows that community involvement in the social data collection process can improve data accuracy by up to 27% compared to a top-down bureaucratic approach. When data is used as the basis for policy decision-making but does not reflect the social reality on the ground, such policies will lose both their social legitimacy and their substantive effectiveness.

Data validity cannot be separated from the political dimension of the data itself. Within the framework of governance, data is not a neutral entity but rather a product of power relations, negotiations among actors, and institutional capacity to produce and manage information (Ciborra, 2005). In Indonesia, the central government's monopoly over data authority, without adequate involvement from local governments and civil society, leads to non-inclusive governance and closes off space for social correction. The Ministry of Social Affairs' deactivation of 7.39 million PBI-JKN beneficiaries in 2025 reflects a systemic failure in social data validation. Although this step was grounded in the spirit of efficiency and targeting accuracy, the reality on the ground shows that many poor and vulnerable individuals were actually affected, as they were unable to meet the reactivation procedures or were not reached during the ground-checking process. This case demonstrates that the governance of social data verification is not merely a matter of technocracy but also concerns distributive justice and the sensitivity of policies to citizens' social conditions (Nurmala Selly Saputri, 2023). Therefore, the challenge ahead is not merely to improve data information systems, but to build collaborative, transparent, and participatory data governance across all levels of government.

In 2025, the Ministry of Social Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia implemented a policy to streamline PBI-JKN beneficiary data by deactivating 7,397,277 participants. This measure was based on the results of a data integrity evaluation using the National Integrated Socioeconomic Data (DTSEN), as well as field validation of welfare classifications based on economic deciles. Of this total, 5,090,334 participants were deactivated because they were not recorded in the DTSEN, while 2,306,943 participants were in the 6th to 10th deciles, which, according to socioeconomic indicators, are no longer considered to be part of the poor or vulnerable groups (Ministry of Social Affairs, 2025)

**Table 1.** Distribution of deactivations by two main categories

<b>Deactivation Category</b>	<b>Number of Participants</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
<i>Not listed in DTSEN</i>	<i>5.090.334</i>	<i>68 %</i>
<i>Listed but in deciles 6–10</i>	<i>2.306.943</i>	<i>32 %</i>
<b>Total</b>	<b>7.397.277</b>	<b>100 %</b>

Normatively, this policy aims to improve the efficiency of the state budget and to ensure that government subsidies are provided only to groups that meet objective, data-based criteria. This is in line with the data-driven policy approach, which emphasizes the importance of evidence in the decision-making process (Head, 2015). However, in practice, this policy raises complex governance issues, particularly when the government's administrative data does not fully reflect citizens' actual socioeconomic conditions. Several regions have reported significant social impacts, including Central Java Province and the city of Tasikmalaya, where thousands of residents claim to have lost access to health services without adequate notice or an explanation for their removal from the system.

Furthermore, this policy highlights limitations in implementing the principles of transparency and public accountability. Not all affected citizens are aware that they can access the reactivation mechanism through the Next Generation Social Welfare Information System (SIKS-NG) application, and even fewer possess the administrative and digital capacity to utilize it effectively. This contradicts the principle of inclusivity in good governance, which requires access to information and meaningful participation in the policy-making process, particularly for vulnerable groups. Thus, although this policy may be justified from a technocratic perspective, its process and implementation reveal a deficit in social accountability and inequities in access to administrative procedures. Reforms to data governance in social policy must recognize that data validity is not merely a product of information systems, but also a reflection of the social and political relations that shape the data collection process itself (Dunn, 2015).

From the perspective of good governance, this phenomenon highlights a gap between centralized data governance, limited mechanisms for citizen participation, and weak coordination among the Ministry of Social Affairs, BPJS, the Directorate General of Civil Registration and Population, and local governments, particularly regarding access to reactivation and social legitimacy. This finding supports the argument that the management of social data should not be merely technocratic but must be accompanied by an interactive system of checks and balances and a fair distribution of power.

The Ministry of Social Affairs' plan to deactivate 7.39 million participants in the National Health Insurance Premium Assistance Program (PBI-JKN) by 2025 has sparked serious debate in the public sphere and within government bureaucracy. This policy, which is nominally intended to improve data-driven targeting, has instead raised concerns about the emergence of new forms of social exclusion among poor and vulnerable communities. In this

context, the question is: to what extent has the governance of social data verification under the PBI-JKN policy been implemented in accordance with the principles of good governance, particularly accountability, transparency, and public participation? How does the implementation of this policy impact the right to access health services for citizens in vulnerable social conditions? To answer these questions, this study aims to analyze the governance of the PBI-JKN participant verification and deactivation policy, highlighting institutional mechanisms, the involvement of cross-sectoral actors, and the policy's implications for social distributive justice.

The urgency of this research lies in the need to dissect data-driven policies within the framework of democratic and responsive governance. Although the digitization and integration of social data are trends in bureaucratic reform, their implementation must be accompanied by methodological caution and socio-political sensitivity, so that the policies designed do not create disparities in access but truly reach the groups most in need. Amid the proliferation of big data-based policies and digital information systems, it has become increasingly important to critically examine how the state builds social justice through data verification processes. This research is expected not only to contribute theoretically to the discourse on social governance but also to provide practical insights for policymakers to improve the design and implementation of social assistance programs.

## **Method**

This study employs a qualitative policy study approach, focusing on the analysis of the implementation and governance of the social data verification policy within the PBI-JKN program. Policy research falls under the category of applied qualitative research, which aims not only to understand social phenomena but also to provide solutions to practical governmental or policy issues (Creswell, 2003). This approach was chosen to examine in depth the relationships between actors, institutional structures, and the socio-political dynamics that shape the process of public policy-making and implementation (Cairney, 2019). Data were collected through a documentary study of laws and regulations, official data from the Ministry of Social Affairs, BPJS Kesehatan reports, publications from the Central Statistics Agency (BPS), as well as credible online news reports covering the implementation of the policy to deactivate PBI-JKN participants at both the national and regional levels. In addition, a literature review of relevant scientific articles was conducted to provide a conceptual foundation, particularly articles that discuss governance, social exclusion, and the validity of policy data.

The analysis was conducted using content analysis, a technique that enables researchers to systematically interpret policy documents and public narratives to identify patterns of power relations, mechanisms of coordination among actors, and indicators of good governance, such as transparency, participation, and accountability (Mayring, 2014). To strengthen the validity of the findings, data source triangulation was performed by comparing official documents, media reports, and academic study results to obtain a comprehensive and scientifically accountable understanding (Subakti et al., 2023). Using this methodology, the study aims to critically explain how the policy on deactivating PBI-JKN participants is managed, as well as how this policy reflects or, conversely, contradicts the principles of good governance.

## **Results and Discussion**

### **The Role of Stakeholders, Governance Implementation, and Policy Impact**

The Indonesian Ministry of Social Affairs' policy to phase out the PBI-JKN program by 2025 is a response to social assistance data reform directives that emphasize the accuracy and

efficiency of benefit distribution based on the National Integrated Socioeconomic Data (DTSEN). Within the framework of ideal governance, this policy should be implemented through strong cross-sectoral coordination and principles of good governance such as transparency, accountability, and participation. However, in practice, the distribution of roles among stakeholders is not yet fully synchronized. The Ministry of Social Affairs serves as the primary data manager and decision-maker for participant deactivation. BPJS Kesehatan serves as the administrative implementer within the JKN membership system, while the Directorate General of Civil Registration and Population (Dukcapil) contributes to the validation of population data. On the other hand, local governments, as both field implementers and public service providers, find themselves in a reactive position with respect to such top-down policies (Saragih & Winardi, 2022; Ministry of Social Affairs, 2025).

The impact of this policy is evident in cases where several regions have experienced a surge in participant deactivations. The following table provides an overview of the affected regions and the local governments' responses:

**Table 2.** Data on the number of areas affected by the policy in East Java Province

Region	Number of Local Government Deactivated Participants	Source
<b>Semarang Regency</b>	21.158	Allocation of Rp6.3 billion from <a href="http://TribunJateng.com">TribunJateng.com</a> (2025) the regional budget; proposal to reactivate thousands of participants
<b>Demak Regency</b>	± 41.000	Services funded through the PBI- <a href="http://RadarKudus.jawapos.com">RadarKudus.jawapos.com</a> APBD and village budget sharing; (2025) preparing for the impact of UHC.
<b>Wonogiri Regency</b>	27.914	Manual re-registration and a call <a href="http://SoloPos.com">SoloPos.com</a> (2025); for voluntary BPJS re-registration <a href="http://Diskominfo Wonogiri">Diskominfo Wonogiri</a>

This table reveals an imbalance in governance roles: National policies are formulated top-down, yet the burden of implementation and responsibility for carrying them out falls heavily on local governments. This situation indicates that opportunities for public participation and for local officials' involvement in the verification and reactivation process remain limited. Furthermore, the role mapping described above reveals a pattern in the distribution of policy burdens: regions with strong digital and social infrastructure (such as Semarang) can respond with rapid budget allocations, whereas other regions are forced to engage in cost-sharing due to limited resources and access to data inputs. This model indicates that the principles of responsiveness and accountability in good governance theory are not uniformly guaranteed, leading to significant disparities in public services across regions.

In theory, a model of good governance requires the equal involvement of all stakeholders in the policy formulation and implementation process. When the distribution of roles is unbalanced, policy responses become uneven and heavily dependent on fiscal capacity and the readiness of local bureaucracies. Local governments with limited resources will struggle to meet the needs of affected residents, which ultimately creates disparities in public services across regions (Dwiyanto, 2021). In this context, the principles of responsiveness and participation have not been fully realized. Thus, the policy to deactivate PBI-JKN participants

has revealed a disconnect between digital data systems and fair, adaptive institutional governance. A reformulation of the policy is needed, one that is not solely based on quantitative data but also considers local social, geographical, and institutional capacities in its implementation.

## **Implementation of Good Governance Principles in the Policy on the Deactivation of PBI-JKN**

### **1. Transparency**

Normatively speaking, transparency requires openness of information that allows the public to access data and justifications for a policy fully. In the context of the deactivation of PBI-JKN, transparency has been only partial: The Ministry of Social Affairs disclosed the number of participants who were deactivated but did not explain in detail the mechanisms, deactivation criteria, or the revalidation process used. This lack of openness makes it difficult for external parties, such as NGOs, academics, and even local governments, to exercise social oversight regarding the potential for policy exclusion. In good governance theory, such openness is crucial to avoid "black box policy-making," where decisions are made without public scrutiny (UNDP, 1996). The absence of a public data dashboard or a portal to track PBI recipients reflects weak institutional transparency at the central level. This reinforces information centralization and could weaken the policy's legitimacy in the eyes of the public and local governments, which serve as the technical implementers.

### **2. Participation**

Participation does not merely mean the public's involvement as subjects of data collection, but also as active participants in the processes of policy formulation, oversight, and evaluation. However, under this policy, there are no consultation mechanisms or participatory forums available for affected communities, either during the DTSEN decile classification process or when membership is revoked. The public is only given the option of individual reactivation, which, in practice, is difficult to carry out due to limited access, limited digital literacy, and bureaucratic slowness. The absence of public participation in this policy results in its implementation in a technocratic, undemocratic manner. This contradicts the participatory principle of deliberative governance theory proposed by Fung (2003), which emphasizes the importance of co-creation in public service. This situation creates a divide between policymakers and citizens and eliminates the opportunity for collective correction of systemic errors.

### **3. Accountability**

Accountability in policy governance requires institutional accountability mechanisms that enable citizens to obtain clarity, file complaints, and monitor program implementation. In practice, there is no integrated, responsive, and independently monitored public complaint channel. Hence, complaints from deactivated participants rely solely on personal efforts to visit social services offices or sub-district offices. The absence of a transparent and documented reporting and response system (such as a national complaint dashboard) renders accountability superficial and vertical. This indicates that accountability for the PBI-JKN policy is directed more upward (administratively) than downward (toward citizens), which is theoretically referred to as "bureaucratic accountability" that has not yet fully shifted to "citizen-centric accountability" (Dwiyanto, 2021). Consequently, public trust in the government regarding social security matters could decline significantly.

### **4. Responsiveness**

Responsiveness measures the government's ability to respond quickly and appropriately to society's needs and dynamics. In several regions, the reactivation system via the SIKS-NG

application has become the primary focus. However, this process has been hampered by structural issues such as the digital divide, a shortage of verification support staff, and slow responses from relevant parties, including BPJS and local social services agencies. Low responsiveness in reactivating PBI-JKN participants demonstrates that our bureaucracy's adaptive capacity remains weak, particularly when the digital systems relied upon lack technical readiness at the local level. This reflects a vertical implementation gap between modern digital national policies and the uneven social realities on the ground. Within the framework of governance, responsiveness indicates the extent to which a system can bridge the gap between "rational design" and "pragmatic adaptation" (Grindle, 2004). An in-depth analysis in Central Java shows that mass deactivation has had a significant impact on access to health care, the achievement of UHC, and the socioeconomic conditions of the poor and vulnerable.


**Table 3.** Data on the impacts and policy implications at the regional level

Region	Deactivated Participants	Impact on the Community	Implications for Local Policy
<b>Semarang</b>	21.158	A concrete example: A single mother and her child with a disability lose their BPJS coverage, threatening the continuity of their chronic treatment	The local government has allocated Rp 5–6.3 billion to cover BPJS premiums and has reactivated dozens of cases.
<b>Demak</b>	± 41.000	Nearly 98% of patients use BPJS; 60% are PBI deactivation threatens the achievement of UHC and limits access for poor/chronic patients.	Nearly 98% of patients use BPJS; 60% of them are PBI beneficiaries. Deactivation threatens the achievement of UHC and limits access for poor and chronically ill patients.
<b>Wonogiri</b>	27.914	Many patients with catastrophic illnesses are excluded from coverage and have difficulty accessing services; the public health risk is high.	The Social Affairs Office has opened a hybrid reactivation counter, is correcting National Identification Numbers (NIK), and is prioritizing critical cases with a response within two weeks.

Based on the table above, this policy could disrupt several key elements. Deactivation disrupts access, particularly for vulnerable patients (single mothers, people with disabilities, and patients with catastrophic illnesses). In Demak, the deactivation of 41,000 participants could reduce UHC coverage from 98% and create gaps in service delivery. Rapid responses by local governments, such as the allocation of Rp 5–6.3 billion in Semarang and Rp 10 billion in Demak, indicate that the cost burden is being shifted to the regions. This raises questions regarding the sustainability of the Regional Budget (APBD) and the need for cost-sharing, particularly in low-income areas. There is a trend toward social exclusion: people with low incomes are at risk of losing access to services without immediate local intervention (e.g., revalidation or reactivation). The digital system (SIKS-NG) cannot reach those who have been deactivated without on-site assistance. Regional responses are ad hoc and depend on human

resource capacity, budget, and information systems. Wonogiri demonstrates a good hybrid response, but not all regions have similar readiness.

Given these issues, it can be concluded that the suspension of the PBI-JKN program has tangible consequences, including disruptions to healthcare access and increased fiscal pressure at the local level. The emergence of reactivation schemes and emergency budgets in local areas represents an ad hoc response rather than part of the central government's policy design. Disparities in implementation lead to variations in service quality and the potential for increased social inequality across regions.



**Figure 1.** Comparison of funding allocation and the number of affected participants

The graph above compares regional budget allocations (in billions of rupiah) with the number of PBI-JKN participants affected by the 2025 deactivation policy across the three priority study areas: Semarang City, Demak Regency, and Wonogiri Regency. This visualization illustrates the policy dynamics occurring at the local level in response to a uniform national decision. Semarang allocated approximately Rp6.3 billion from the Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBD) as compensation for deactivating 21,158 participants. This fiscal response demonstrates the city government's tangible efforts to maintain the continuity of health services, particularly for vulnerable groups not directly covered by the national program. Semarang is also selectively reactivating participants, prioritizing high-priority cases such as chronic patients and children with disabilities.

Meanwhile, Demak Regency faces an even greater challenge: a total of 41,000 participants have been deactivated, the majority of whom are poor residents who previously relied heavily on the BPJS PBI program. In response, the Demak local government has allocated Rp10 billion over the next six months. These funds will be used to finance PBI-APBD services and to support a cost-sharing scheme between the regency and villages. The high number of affected participants and the size of the allocated funds indicate that Demak has been severely impacted, both fiscally and socially, by this policy.

Unlike these two regions, Wonogiri Regency recorded a far higher number of affected participants, with approximately 100,000 people (27,914 families) affected. However, no explicit data were found regarding the size of the local budget allocation to address the surge in inactive participants. This is why there is no funding allocation bar for Wonogiri in the

previous graph, as valid and verified fiscal information has not yet been available in news or official reports to date. Nevertheless, the Wonogiri Regency Government continues to undertake several responsive measures, such as opening online and offline reactivation counters and conducting re-registration through a hybrid system.

## Conclusion

The Ministry of Social Affairs' policy to deactivate 7.39 million PBI-JKN participants by 2025 indicates that the governance of digitally based social data verification still faces fundamental challenges in data integration, transparency, accountability, participation, and responsiveness. The main findings of this study reveal that although the policy is normatively intended to improve the targeting of health assistance, its implementation process is not yet fully supported by inclusive validation mechanisms and strong central-local coordination. Disparities in fiscal and administrative capacity at the local level, particularly in the City of Semarang, Demak Regency, and Wonogiri Regency, result in varying policy responses in addressing affected residents. The impact of this policy is not only administrative but also social. The deactivation of PBI-JKN participants has the potential to create new social exclusion, particularly for the poor, vulnerable groups, those with chronic illnesses, people with disabilities, and households with economic constraints. The sudden loss of access to health services demonstrates that bureaucratic digitization without social sensitivity can deepen inequalities, rather than merely improving policy targeting. Theoretically, this study underscores the importance of integrating a good governance perspective into social data reform, particularly through the principles of transparency, participation, accountability, and responsiveness. In practical terms, the findings of this study recommend strengthening the integration of central and local data, establishing an open and responsive public complaint system, providing affirmative protection for vulnerable groups, and conducting policy evaluations that involve local governments, civil society, and academics. Thus, digital reforms in social security policies must be directed not only toward administrative efficiency but also toward social justice and the protection of citizens' fundamental rights to health care.

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